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Abstract
Correctness problems in the iBGP routing, the de-facto standard to spread global routing informa-
tion in Autonomous Systems, are a well-known issue. Configurations may route cost-suboptimal,
inconsistent, or even behave non-convergent and -deterministic. However, even if a lot of studies
have shown many exemplary problematic configurations, the exact scope of the problem is largely
unknown: Up to now, it is not clear which problems may appear under which iBGP architectures.
The exact scope of the iBGP correctness problem is of high theoretical and practical interest.
Knowledge on the resistance of specific architecture schemes against certain anomaly classes and
the reasons may help to improve other iBGP schemes. Knowledge on the specific problems of the
different schemes helps to identify the right scheme for an AS and develop workarounds.
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1 Introduction
The Internet we know today is a system of independent, interconnected Autonomous Systems
(ASs). The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) [12] is the de-facto standard used to exchange
global routing information between ASs. The process of spreading global routing information
within ASs is usually implemented via internal BGP (iBGP), a particular operational mode
of BGP. However, even if iBGP is widely used, it may come along with correctness problems.
1.1 Motivation and Objectives
While classical iBGP is based on a logical full-mesh, expected scalability problems led quickly
to the development of alternative information exchange schemes. Two of these schemes, BGP
Route Reflection [2] and AS Confederations [14], were finally standardized, implemented, and
frequently deployed. Today, it is well known that these schemes are prone to serious correctness
problems [6]. Various studies, cf. [6, 9], for example, have shown different classes of conflicts
with basic correctness properties; iBGP anomalies. However, even if the causes are known [5],
the scope of the problem is still unknown: Are iBGP anomalies a direct consequence of using
scalability techniques or may similar problems also appear if full-mesh iBGP is used? What
causes may appear under which iBGP information exchange schemes? Is – and how is – it
possible to address the causes with operational means, i.e. without any protocol modifications?
Adequate answers are of high theoretical and practical interest: They help protocol designers
to combine the advantages of different schemes and support operators addressing anomalies.
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1.2 Directly Related Work
In 2000, studies of Cisco Systems [6] and McPherson et al. [12] showed that the iBGP routing
is prone to consistency problems in general. Two years later, Griffin et al. [9] could show that
consistency problems are only the tip of the iceberg: They presented a series of simple and
largely realistic configurations revealing further correctness problems. In the same year, Basu
et al. [1] proved that at least verifying the consistency of an iBGP configuration is NP-hard.
Based on this insight, different concepts which try to alleviate or avoid the observed problems
were developed in the following years. However, since none of them can be used unconditional-
ly in production systems, iBGP anomalies are still an issue today. An interesting aspect of all
previous studies is that anomalies are usually understood as a side-effect of an information
reduction compared to fully meshed iBGP [10, 11]. Some studies even go that far to implicitly
assume full-mesh iBGP as inherently anomaly-free [7] – without any proof.
Even if the root causes for iBGP anomalies are well-known [5], the exact scope of the
problem was never studied. Today, it is known that scalability techniques facilitates effects
inducing anomalies. However, a complete, structured overview of the problem does not exist.
Problems in full-mesh iBGP are unknown so far. This is the starting point for our analyses.
1.3 Paper Outline
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. At first, in section 2, we summarize the most
important aspects of iBGP relevant in the context of this paper. In section 3, we introduce the
problems that may come along with iBGP and sketch their root causes. Knowing the different
anomaly classes, in section 4 we study the standardized iBGP schemes in terms of their vulner-
ability to the anomaly classes. In section 5, we give an outlook on possible workarounds and
solutions. Finally, we close with a short conclusion and aspects for future work in section 6.
2 The Border Gateway Protocol
The Border Gateway Protocol is a classical path vector protocol. In this section, we outline the
main aspects of BGP that are relevant in the context of the following analyses. Nevertheless,
readers of this paper should be familiar with internal BGP, BGP Route Reflection, and AS
Confederations. Details on iBGP and its exchange schemes may be found in [2, 12] and [14].
2.1 Basics on the Border Gateway Protocol
Today, BGP is the de-facto standard Exterior Gateway Protocol. BGP speakers forward traffic
via a unique best path. This path is determined by applying the BGP path selection function
on all known paths. Paths are known due to local configuration and advertisements of system-
external and -internal BGP peers. BGP peers only advertise their best path and only if this
path is not already known. To be able to focus on iBGP issues, we assume that the external
and local paths each speaker knows are time-invariant. Traffic forwarding via a path is realized
via the BGP next-hop it specifies. Under common edge conditions (as assumed in this paper),
it specifies the router where the path is externally learned or locally configured. Traffic that
reaches this router is correctly forwarded out of the AS. The forwarding to the BGP next-hop
is realized on a hop-by-hop basis via the shortest Interior Gateway Protocol (IGP) route.
A BGP path is defined by path attributes. The Local Preference, AS-path Length, Origin
Code, Multi Exit Discriminator (MED), and peer-AS are global path attributes. In contrast
to local attributes, they are equal on every router within an AS. They do not depend on the
topological position within the AS. Based on the path attributes, paths can be compared.
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2.2 The BGP Path Selection Process
Let pi denote the paths known by a BGP speaker v for a certain destination. After removing
unresolvable paths from pi, v’s best path is determined by the following selection process. If
pi is empty, no best path for the destination exists on router v.
Step 0) Remove all paths from pi that are not tied for having the lowest Local Preference.
Step 1) If any path is locally configured on v, remove all non-local paths from pi.
Step a) Remove all paths from pi that are not tied for having the shortestAS-path Length.
Step b) Remove all paths from pi that are not tied for specifying the lowest Origin Code.
Step c) Remove all paths from pi that do not have the best MED for their peer-AS group.
Step d) If paths are externally learned, remove all internally learned paths from pi.
Step e) Remove all paths from pi that are not tied for having the lowest IGP distance to
the specified BGP next-hop.
Step f) Remove all paths from pi which are not tied for specifying the lowest BGP ID.
Step g) Choose and return the path from pi that specifies the lowest Peer-address.
An important aspect of the selection process is the fact that MEDs can only be compared if
the paths specify the same peer-AS. The peer-AS specifies the source of a routing information.
It can be derived from the AS-path attribute, cf. [12]. As MEDs can only be compared within
a peer-AS group, path rankings may behave non-transitive: For arbitrary paths p, q, and r,
it may hold that p<q, q<r, and r<p, where < is the order defined by the selection process,
cf. figure 5.a). Details on the other BGP path attributes may be found in [12].
2.3 Terms and Identifiers
To establish a common language, a few terms and identifiers are introduced at first. A path,
i.e. the external or local BGP routing information a router knows, is denoted as BGP path. A
BGP path is propagated via signaling paths according to the applied iBGP scheme through
an AS. The tuple of BGP path and BGP next-hop specifies all forwarding information a
signaling path contains. It is denoted as delivery path. A signaling path resolvable at router
v that is propagated according to the applied iBGP scheme is called permitted at v∈V . The
set V covers all routers within the AS. The set of paths permitted at v is written as Pv. The
selection process of BGP defined above is formalized by the selection function λ. λ is always
applied for the local view of a router v, written as λv, to a subset of its permitted paths. If λv
is applied up to and including step e) to all paths Pv permitted at v, the router’s cost-optimal
paths Ωvc =λv(Pv) are calculated. They optimize the forwarding costs. The definition stresses
the fact that the BGP ID and Peer-address are only tie-breaker criteria. We label signaling
paths usually with the letters p or q. A signaling path p permitted at v is usually identified
as pv. The underlying delivery path is labeled as p˙v, the BGP path as p¯.
Once traffic reaches the BGP next-hop, it leaves the system by definition. The forwarding
to the BGP next-hop is realized via the AS’s IGP. The IGP forwarding route from v to the
BGP next-hop a delivery path p˙v specifies is labeled as fv→p˙v . The route without the BGP
next-hop (the last physical hop on the IGP route) is written as f1v→p˙v .
In what follows, we study the BGP routing in an iBGP configuration. Such a configuration
is defined by the routers V , the physical network topology in the AS, the BGP paths available
at each v∈V , and the AS’s iBGP peering structure. The routing decision v has made is defined
by the delivery path the selected best path represents. The tuple s=(p˙1, ..., p˙n) |1≤ i≤n, i∈V
of delivery paths specifies the state a configuration has entered. Over time, the configuration
moves from state to state until a stable state is entered: The delivery paths the routers select
do not change any more. The set of all states the configuration may enter is written as S.
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3 IBGP Routing Anomalies and their Root Causes
Even if the specific demands on routing protocols and information exchange schemes generally
differ, correctness specifies a universally valid requirement. Details on this requirement and
the causes for the problems iBGP comes along with are discussed in what follows.
3.1 Correctness Properties and Routing Anomalies
The correctness of a routing protocol is determined by three basic properties: Expressiveness,
Global Consistency, and Robustness [5, 7, 8]. A protocol behaves correct, if these properties
are fulfilled in arbitrary configurations that match the protocol specification. A definition of
the three correctness properties is given in what follows. Details may be found in [5].
3.1.1 Expressiveness
Expressiveness is the first correctness property. It states that the routing implements traffic
forwarding according to the “natural forwarding costs”. This means that if a destination is
reachable via a policy-conform path, traffic forwarding is implemented via a cost-optimal path.
The cost-optimal paths are determined by the distance metric the protocol uses. As specified
for iBGP, cf. section 2.3, they remain after applying the cost-relevant steps of the protocol’s
path selection process to all available paths. Tie-breaker rules are cost-irrelevant. If a router
does not comply with expressiveness, it routes cost-suboptimal, cf. figure 1.a). Cost-suboptimal
routing decisions lead to unnecessary costs and may even foil traffic transition arrangements
like – in case of BGP – defined by the MED.
3.1.2 Global Consistency
Global consistency is an essential property for hop-by-hop based routing protocols. It states
that the local routing decisions routers make are free of conflicts: If traffic is forwarded by a
hop to another to reach a destination via a certain route, the next-hop has to continue the
intended route. If a next-hop on an intended route redirects traffic onto another route or to
another destination, inconsistency is present, cf. figure 1.b). Local policies may be overridden
and – in special circumstances [9] – forwarding loops may be induced.
3.1.3 Robustness
Robustness means that the local processes the protocol defines always lead to a stable state.
The routing must converge. The state the configuration finally enters must be predictable in
advance if the initial state and configuration are known. The routing processes must behave
deterministic. If the routing may not converge, it is vulnerable to divergence. If the final state
is not predictable, the routing is vulnerable to non-determinism, cf. figure 1.c). Divergence
and non-determinism may cause paket re-orderings, losses, and complicate routing analyses.
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Figure 1 Conceptual illustration of cost-suboptimal routing, inconsistency, and non-determinism.
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3.2 IBGP Anomalies and their Root Causes
Using the identifiers defined in section 2.3, anomalies in the iBGP routing can be traced back
to six root causes, cf. [5]. They are introduced in what follows. Note that in contrast to the
generic definitions given in section 3.1, the root causes are specific for the protocol.
3.2.1 Cost-suboptimal Routing
Obviously, it only makes sense to assess a routing decision as cost-suboptimal if the decision
is permanently. This is the case, if the configuration has entered a stable state s ∈ S. In this
state, every router v ∈ V selects its best path by applying the selection process to the known
paths. Consequently, cost-suboptimal routing is present in state s, if and only if
∃v ∈ V : λv(pivs ) /∈ Ωvc ,
where pivs denotes the paths known in state s. Due to the design of BGP, this may have two
reasons: Obviously, a router cannot select a cost-optimal path as best one if no such path is
known. If such paths are known, they may be masked since no transitive ordering relation is
defined, cf. figure 5.a). Both root causes can formally be differed as
v ∈ V : (pivs ∩ Ωvc ) = ∅ (1) and v ∈ V : (pivs ∩ Ωvc ) 6= ∅ ∧ λv(pivs ) /∈ Ωvc (2).
3.2.2 Inconsistency
Similar to cost-suboptimal routing, referring to inconsistency only makes sense if a configura-
tion has entered a stable state s ∈ S. By assumption, traffic is correctly delivered once it has
reached the BGP next-hop, cf. section 2.1. Inconsistent local views may thus only appear on
the IGP route to the BGP next-hop: A router may take away the traffic from the intended
route and redirects it to another BGP next-hop. Another delivery path is used. It holds that
∃v ∈ V, u ∈ f1v→p˙v \ {v} : p˙v 6= p˙u,
where px = λx(pixs ) denotes the best path of and pixs the paths known by router x ∈ {v, u} in
state s. If inconsistency is not a side-effect of a cost-suboptimal routing, it is caused by dissent-
ing local views. Dissenting views of v and u may have two reasons: Firstly, they may appear
due to a simple lack of routing information required for consistent routing decisions. Provided
with adequate paths, u and v choose consistent delivery paths. The basic problem is illustrated
in a simplified manner in figure 2.a). Secondly, inconsistent views may be a result of dissenting
path rankings. The BGP paths are not equivalently preferred by v and u. Induced by cost-
relevant local path attributes that behave non-isotonicly [13] on a forwarding route, additional
routing information is not helpful, cf. figure 2.b). Both root causes can be formalized as
∀pv, qv∈Pv, pu, qu∈Pu | u∈f1v→p˙v:
λv({pv, qv})=pv⇒λu({pu, qu})=pu
| p˙v = p˙u, q¯v = q¯u
(3) and
∃pv, qv∈Pv, pu, qu∈Pu | u∈f1v→p˙v:
λv({pv, qv})=pv 6⇒λu({pu, qu})=pu
| p˙v = p˙u, q¯v = q¯u
(4).
3.2.3 Divergence and Non-determinism
In contrast to cost-suboptimal routing and inconsistency, robustness problems do not affect
single states. They refer to an unwanted behavior of transitions between states sx ∈ S. If a
configuration is vulnerable to divergence, a cycle may be traversed. Formally, it holds that
∃s0, sx, sy ∈ S : s0→¨sx→¨sy→¨sx | sx 6= sy,
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Figure 2 Inconsistency is either a result of an information lack (b) or dissenting path rankings (b).
where s0 denotes an initial state of the configuration. If a configuration is vulnerable to non-
determinism, state transitions from an initial state to at least two different stable states exist.
If sx and sy denote stable states, it formally holds that
∃s0, sx, sy ∈ S : sx←¨s0→¨sy | sx 6= sy.
Both, vulnerability to divergence and non-determinism can be traced back to a conceptual
defect of the state transition function. It holds that:
An iBGP extension or architecture scheme causes vulnerability to divergence, if and only if its
update process definition does not define a partial order on the possible states arbitrary iBGP
configuration may enter. [5] (5)
An iBGP extension or architecture scheme causes vulnerability to non-determinism, if and
only if the partial order does not define a least element on the states an arbitrary configuration
may enter. [5] (6)
The root causes for robustness problems are shown in figure 3.a) and .b). Figure 3.c) illustrates
the basic idea behind robust state transitions.
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Figure 3 Divergent (a), non-deterministic (b), and robust (partial order, least state) (c) transitions.
4 Studies for Common IBGP Information Exchange Schemes
In literature, correctness problems in the iBGP routing are usually associated with information
reduction schemes, cf. section 1.2. Anomalies in fully meshed iBGP configurations were never
demonstrated. However, neither the correctness of full-mesh iBGP was ever entirely proven
nor systematically studied to which root causes the information reduction schemes are prone
to. Evaluating these aspects is tackled in what follows.
4.1 Full-meshed iBGP
Full-meshed iBGP, the original AS-internal BGP scheme specified in the protocol standard [12],
realizes a logical full-mesh for the information exchange. As shown in [3, 5], the state transition
process based on such a full-mesh can be mapped to a partial order relation with a least
element. This property excludes the root causes (5) and (6) for arbitrary configurations; full-
mesh iBGP always behave robust. Whether the remaining root causes can appear is unclear.
4.1.1 Cost-suboptimal Routing
As explained in section 3.2.1, cost-suboptimal routing decisions may have two different causes:
Either no cost-optimal path is known (1) or sub-optimal paths mask the cost-optimal ones
KiVS’11
8 The Scope of the IBGP Routing Anomaly Problem
(2). In a fully meshed configuration, the first root cause may never appear while the second
one may appear. Both properties are proven in what follows.
Firstly, we show that if a configuration is fully meshed, every router knows a cost-optimal
path. Let v ∈ V be a router of a configuration that has entered a stable state. By assumption,
it knows none of its cost-optimal paths. Furthermore, let p ∈ Ωvc be an arbitrary cost-optimal
path of v. Let u ∈ V denote the BGP next-hop where the underlying BGP path p¯ is local or
external. It knows a signaling path p¯(u) corresponding to the same BGP path p¯. Both paths
p and p¯(u) specify equal global path attributes. As shown in figure 4, three cases are possible:
If v=u, cf. figure 4.a), it holds that p= p¯(u). A cost-optimal path is known. If v 6=u, u may
have chosen path q ∈ Pu |q 6= p¯(u) as its best path, cf. figure 4.b). Compared to p¯(u) and p,
this path specifies global attributes of equal preference. Otherwise, as it can be verified easily,
u would either not choose q as its best path or p would not be cost-optimal on v. Since p¯(u)
is local or external on u, q must be local or external on u, too. If this would not be the case,
u would not select q as its best path. Consequently, the signaling path q¯(u, v) permitted and
known at v representing q¯ specifies u as BGP next-hop. It comes along with the same IGP
distance like path p. All in all, q¯(u, v) and p specify cost-relevant path attributes of equal
preference. It holds that q¯(u, v) ∈ Ωvc . As this path is known at v, v knows a cost-optimal
path. Finally, it may be that u 6= v has selected p¯(u) as its best path. Due to the fact that a
full-mesh is applied, this path is expanded to v and thus known. In all three cases, at least
one cost-optimal path is known by v. This is a contradiction to the assumptions.
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Figure 4 Realizing iBGP via a full-mesh, each router v∈V knows at least one cost-optimal path.
Path maskings, root cause (2), may appear since BGP does not define a transitive ordering
relation on arbitrary paths. The basic problem is shown in figure 5.a): Knowing three with
respect to the first four attributes equally preferred paths p, q, and r for two peer-AS groups
x and y, MEDs are evaluated in step c). For those paths q and r specifying the same peer-AS
group y, the MEDs are compared. If different MEDs are specified, the path with the worse
MED, here r, is discarded. If path q is now beaten by p in the remaining steps of the selection
process, knowledge on q may be essential for a cost-optimal routing decision: If q is unknown,
p may lose the decision process against r due to attributes evaluated after step c), the MED.
The cost-suboptimal path r can mask path p if q is unknown, even if p is cost-optimal.
As shown in figure 5.b), a situation where a cost-optimal path is masked may also appear
if an iBGP configuration is fully meshed. Router u knows all three available exit points. In
the decision process, q¯(u) beats r¯(v, u) in step c) (lower MED), and p¯(u) beats q¯(u) in step f)
(lower BGP ID). Consequently, v is not aware of q¯(u, v). The known cost-optimal path p¯(u, v)
is masked by r¯(v), cf. figure 5.a). For all that is known, this possibility was unknown so far.
4.1.2 Inconsistency
As explained in section 3.2.1, inconsistent routing decisions can have two different root causes:
Missing information on relevant paths (3) and dissenting path rankings (4). Using an iBGP
full-mesh, a lack of information that leads to inconsistent local views, root cause (3), cannot
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Figure 5 The BGP path selection process does not define a transitive ordering relation (a). This
may cause path maskings even in fully meshed iBGP configurations (b).
appear. As depicted in figure 6, the full-mesh structure ensures that v and u learn the same
delivery paths from all other routers w ∈ V \{v, u}. Since v forwards traffic system-internally,
its best path is internally learned. It does not advertise any path. Router u has either chosen
an internally learned path as best path and advertises no path or else has chosen a local or
external path which is advertised to v. All in all, the information basis v and u have only
differ in externally learned and locally configured non-best paths.
By assumption, we know that if we take only the common information basis into account, v
and u select a representation of the same BGP path. This is guaranteed by the edge condition
defined by equation (3). The routing is consistent. As local paths are preferred in step 1) of
the selection process, a router’s non-best local path certainly has a lower Local Preference than
its best path. Consequently, if such a path is known on v or u, it has no effect on the routers’
routing decisions. External paths are preferred in step d). Thus, if a non-best external path is
known, the best path specifies better global path attributes: A higher Local Preference (LP),
equal LP and shorter AS-path Length (ASpL), equal LP, ASpL, and lower Origin Code (OC),
or equal LP, ASpL,OC, and same peer-AS group with lower MED. Again, in all possible
cases externally learned paths have no effect on the routing decision. Consequently, even if
such paths are known, the same routing decision is made as if only the common information
base would be known. Root cause (3) can never occur if full-meshed iBGP is used.
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Figure 6 Using a full-mesh, the routing information of v and u differ only by local and external
non-best paths (a). Despite of the full-mesh, inconsistency due to root cause (4) may appear (b, c).
Next, we check whether full-mesh iBGP is prone to root cause (4). For that purpose, we
analyze the decision process and try to identify paths satisfying the equation. For paths that
match the equation, we sketch an exemplary configuration. If equation 4 is satisfied, it holds
that p˙v = p˙= p˙u, q¯v = q¯= q¯u, and that router v prefers pv to qv. Based on these assumptions
and the fact that v forwards traffic to a BGP next-hop “behind” u, all possible preferences for
the representations permitted at v and u are shown in the RC4-tree, cf. figure 7. Equation (4)
is satisfied, if v prefers pv, while u prefers qu. Note that p˙v = p˙= p˙u ⇒ p¯v = p¯= p¯u.
Local Preference If path pv is preferred to qv by v due to a higher Local Preference, path
pu is also preferred over qu by u. This is the case, since the Local Preference is a global path
attribute. It is the same for all representations of a BGP path. If both underlying BGP paths
specify the same Local Preference, the subsequent attributes define the path preferences of v
and u. Following steps of the decision process are of interest.
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Figure 7 Possible path preferences under the assumptions given by root cause (4). Blue leaves
specifying preferences satisfying root cause (4) (RC4), green ones specify a conflict.
Local Paths If step 1) is relevant, neither v nor u prefers any of its paths yet. By assumption,
p¯ is neither local on v nor on u. Since v does not prefer qv, q¯ is not local on v, too. The cases
that q¯ is local on u (qu: local) and that it is not local on u (qu: not local) remain.
AS-path Length If q¯ is local on u, it specifies an AS-path Length of zero. As v prefers path
pv, the AS-path Length of p¯ must be zero, too. Following path attributes define the final
preferences. This is also the case if q¯ is not local on u, while both BGP paths specify the
same AS-path Length. If p¯ specifies a shorter AS-path, v prefers pv and u prefers pu.
Origin Code As pv is preferred by v, path p¯ specifies the same or a better Origin Code than
q¯. In the former case, independent of whether q¯ is local on u or not, v has no preference yet.
Following attributes are crucial. In the latter case, v prefers pu. If q¯ is not local on u, u also
prefers pu, equation (4) is not satisfied. If q¯ is locally configured on u, u prefers path qu. This
satisfies equation (4). An example that realizes this case is illustrated in figure 6.b).
MED Since pv is preferred by v, p¯ specifies either the same (or an incomparable) or a better
MED than q¯. In the former case, the following attributes are crucial, independent of whether
q¯ is local on u or not. In the latter case, pu is preferred on u if qu is not local on u. The root
cause is not matched. If qu is local on u, path qu is already preferred by u. Root cause (4) is
satisfied. However, this scenario seems unusual: Since both paths specify an empty AS-path,
both paths are locally configured in the AS. For local paths, the MED is usually not specified.
A default value is evaluated instead. Nevertheless, a conceivable example is shown figure 6.c).
External Paths According to local paths, no path is externally learned on v and q¯ may be
external on u. If q¯ is local on u, it cannot be external on u, too. If q¯ is not local on u, it may
be external on u or not. Three cases that may satisfy equation (4) remain, cf. figure 7.
IGP Distance As we assume that IGP distances increase strictly monotonically, the distance
from v to u is smaller than the distance to any BGP next-hop behind u. Consequently, if q¯
is local or external on u while the preceding attributes did not define a preference on v yet,
v prefers path qv. This is a contradiction to the assumptions. It remains the case that q¯ is
neither local nor external on u. If the BGP next-hop given by p˙ is closer to v than the one
given by q˙, this also holds for u. Equation (4) may only hold if both IGP distances are equal.
BGP ID In the remaining open case, pv and qv as well as pu and qu are equally preferred by
v and u, respectively. They are internally learned on v and u. Because every router advertises
only its best path and p¯ 6= q¯, both pv and qv as well as pu and qu specify different BGP IDs.
As v prefers pv, pv specifies a lower BGP ID than qv. If path pu also specifies a lower BGP
ID than qu, consistent rankings are defined. If pu specifies a worse ID than qu, root cause (4)
is matched. However, in a full-mesh, this case cannot appear in practice: Since pv and pu as
well as qv and qu are advertised by the same router, pu specifies the same BGP ID like pu
and qu like qu. Consequently, pu has a lower BGP ID than qu.
All in all, full-meshed iBGP turned out to be prone to expressiveness and global consistency
problems. The correctness problems that may appear are summarized in table 1.
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Expressiveness Problems Global Consistency Problems Robustness Problems
No known Path Lack of relevant Inconsistent Cyclic state No least
optimal path (1) maskings (2) paths (3) path rankings (4) transitions (5) state exists (6)
impossible possible impossible possible impossible
Table 1 Possible root causes for iBGP anomalies in fully-meshed iBGP configurations.
4.2 BGP Route Reflection AS Confederations
Since Route Reflectors and routers within a member-AS are fully meshed, Route Reflection
and AS Confederations are prone to the same problems like full-mesh iBGP. However, as both
concepts realize an information reduction compared to a full-mesh, further causes may appear.
Anomalies caused by a lack of information (root cause (1) and (3)) as well as robustness
problems are well-known and well-studied phenomenas if Route Reflection or a Confederation
is applied. For that reason and due to the space limitation, we confine ourselves to sketch only
the conceptual problems for these problem classes.
A cost-suboptimal routing decision due to a lack of cost-optimal paths, root cause (1), is
very easy to induce. It appears if the Route Reflectors or the member-AS Border Routers do
not reflect a router’s cost-optimal paths. This behavior occurs if none of the relevant paths is
the best one from the reflectors’ points of view. A simple example for such a configuration is
shown in figure 8.a). An example for AS Confederations can be designed analogously. Root
cause (3), inconsistent routing decisions due to a lack of relevant information, can be induced
in a similar way. Inconsistent routing decisions are made, if router u on the IGP forwarding
route to the BGP next-hop knows a better path q¯ that is not reflected. Again, this is the case
if q˙ is not the best delivery path from the reflectors’ points of view. An example configuration
is depicted in figure 8.b). A comparable configuration can be designed for Confederations, too.
The fact that information reduction may cause cyclic state transitions and avoid that a least
state is defined, root cause (5) and (6), is thoroughly studied. Readers who are interested in
the details may be referred to [9], for example.
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Figure 8 Classical examples for cost-suboptimal routing due to root cause (1) (a), inconsistency due
to root cause (3) (b), and dissenting rankings due to the BGP ID (c). Example (b) is taken from [9].
Finally, we take a quick look on inconsistency due to dissenting path rankings, root cause
(4), in ASs using Route Reflection and AS Confederations. An important difference between
full-mesh iBGP and schemes which reflect paths is that representations of the same delivery
path on different routers may specify different BGP IDs. As a result of this property, the third
possible path preference that matches root cause (4), cf. the RC4-tree in figure 7, may occur.
An example for such a configuration is shown in figure 8.c): Routers v and u both learn two
cost-optimal paths p˙ and q˙ from two different routers. Due to the BGP ID, u prefers q˙, while
v prefers p˙. Note that this case is of high relevance in practice. Network Operators in large
ASs usually use several redundant reflectors per cluster to avoid single points of failure. A
similar configuration can also be designed for AS Confederations. The root causes for iBGP
anomalies that may appear if scalability techniques are used are summarized in table 2.
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Expressiveness Problems Global Consistency Problems Robustness Problems
No known Path Lack of relevant Inconsistent Cyclic state No least
optimal path (1) maskings (2) paths (3) path rankings (4) transitions (5) state exists (6)
trivial possible trivial possible possible
Table 2 Possible root causes for anomalies in ASs using Route Reflection or AS Confederations.
5 Workarounds and Solutions
Understanding the protocol and configuration properties that induce iBGP anomalies, possible
countermeasures can be discussed. We differ between solutions and workarounds: Solutions
correct conceptual defects but require protocol changes. Workarounds are quickly deployable
patches that avoid unwanted behavior in production systems. Due to the space limitation, we
only sketch the basic ideas.
Unknown cost-optimal paths, root cause (1), appear if a router’s local view is not matched
by any of its BGP peers’ best path selection. Information on the cost-optimal paths is not
forwarded. To avoid this problem, reflectors could advertise paths matching to the receivers’
point of view – independent of their own best path decision. A scheme realizing this concept
is the iBGP Route Server architecture, cf. [4]. Using common information reduction schemes,
problems are avoided if every cluster shares a common local view. To reach this, the distances
of the links must ensure that cluster-internal BGP next-hops are always closer than -external
ones. However, this workaround is a serious limitation for the IGP routing. Path maskings,
root cause (2), are avoided if the selection process defines a transitive ordering relation on
arbitrary paths. This can be reached if the MED is not evaluated at all or across all peer-AS,
cf. [11]. Alternatively, it can be ensured that every router knows an AS-cost-optimal path for
each peer-AS group [4]. However, this is not trivial in arbitrary configurations in general.
Consistency problems due to a lack of relevant routing information, root cause (3), are
avoided if routers on a future forwarding route have a comparable information basis for
their routing decisions. Improvements can be achieved here if additional cluster-internal
BGP sessions are kept. However, this workaround counteracts with the intended information
reduction and – which is the greater problem – can be the source of inconsistent routing,
cf. [9]. Dissenting rankings, root cause (4), are avoided if all routers on a future forwarding
route prefer the same delivery paths. However, to reach this, modifications on the selection
process are necessary. Using a full-mesh, operators can achieve consistent rankings by means
of a simple workaround, given by two design rules: Firstly, paths for a destination originated
within the own AS must specify the same Origin Code. Secondly, MEDs must not be used
for local paths. Controlled by the operator, both properties can be realized easily in ASs.
Robustness problems can be addressed in various different ways. Redesigning the protocol
and the information exchange scheme, it is possible to ensure that an optimal state always
exists and that this state is certainly entered, cf. [4]. Making use of common iBGP schemes,
cyclic dependencies between the cost-optimal paths of routers in different clusters can be
studiously avoided, cf. [11]. This can be reached by design rules comparable to those specified
above. However, also similar problems are induced. Other concepts are based on modified
path preferences [15], the exchange of additional information [16], and cycle detection [10].
6 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we systematically analyzed the possibility of anomalies when using the standard-
ized iBGP routing information exchange schemes. The most interesting results were obtained
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for full-mesh iBGP: While we could prove that full-mesh iBGP is resistant to problems caused
by an information lack, we could also reveal that path maskings and inconsistent rankings
may appear. This observation clearly falsifies that iBGP anomalies are only a consequence of
an information reduction, a position many studies convey. For BGP Route Reflection and AS
Confederations, we could give a systematic overview on the for the great part known effects.
Understanding that and why full-mesh iBGP is clearly more resistant to anomalies seems
to be an important increase of knowledge. Drafts for new iBGP extensions come along with
similar conceptual defects like Route Reflection. Knowledge why certain iBGP schemes are
prone or resistant to different root causes could help to avoid that new correctness problems
are caused by the final standards. Besides this, the knowledge could also help to improve the
existing schemes in the long term. In addition to protocol designers, the results gained here
are also of interest for Network Operators. Knowing why certain root causes appear helps to
develop and deploy adequate workarounds like network design rules for the existing schemes.
Moreover, it becomes easier to evaluate iBGP scheme alternatives and identify the right one
for the own AS. Even if we sketched first ideas in section 5, addressing anomalies so that the
solution is usable in production systems is an important aspect for future research.
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